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DE JURE REVOLUTION?
MargaretM. Russell*
FAILED REVOLUTIONS:

SOCIAL REFORM AND THE LiMrrs OF

LEGAL IMAGINATION. By Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic.

Boulder: Westview Press. 1994. Pp. xix, 207. Cloth, $55; paper,
$22.95.
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND OF LAW
YERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION. By Jack

Greenberg. New York: Basic Books. 1994. Pp. xxii, 634. $30.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE QUEST FOR

LAW REFORM IN THE

POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA

At first glance, Crusadersin the Courts: How a DedicatedBand
of Lawyers Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution, by Jack Greenberg,' and Failed Revolutions: Social Reform and the Limits of

Legal Imagination, by Richard Delgado 2 and Jean Stefancic, 3 appear to have little in common. Certainly, they are vastly different in

genre, subject matter, scope, perspective, and tone. Greenberg, the
former Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund -

also known as the "Inc. Fund," or simply "LDF'

-

offers Crusadersin the Courts both as a detailed history of LDF's
preeminent role in the creation of twentieth-century civil rights law
and as a personal memoir of his thirty-five years there as a litigator
and organizational leader. Consistent with the structure and style

of many historical and personal reminiscences, Crusaders in the
Courts relies heavily on a straightforward chronological narrative
peppered with colorful and riveting anecdotes of its protagonists'

legendary deeds; in Greenberg's book, the heroes include Thur* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; A.B. 1979,
Princeton University, L.D. 1984, Stanford Law School; JS.. 1990, Stanford Law School. Ed. I gratefully acknowledge H. Lee Halterman and research assistants Dennis Chiu and
Gene Stith for their support.
1. Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
2. Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. Delgado is widely viewed as a preeminent scholar of critical race theory and is one of its most
prolific writers. See, eg., CRrriCAL RACE TmORY THE Curm-o EDGE (Richard Delgado
ed., 1995); MAit J. MA'rSUDA, CHARLEs R LAWRENCE III, RiCHAD Dr.oADo, AND
K, mou Wn.iims CRENsHAw, WoRDs THAT WOUND: CRmCAL RACE THaoRy, As-E1NT
(1993).
SAULTIVE SPEEc-, AND TRE FRsT Am

3. Research Associate, University of Colorado School of Law.
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good Marshall,4 Constance Baker Motley,5 Robert L. Carter,6
Greenberg himself, and myriad other LDF lawyers who crafted the
legal strategy of the modem civil rights era with such landmark
cases as Brown v. Board of Education,7 Furman v. Georgia,8 and
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 9 Greenberg's assessment of LDF's overall record, though occasionally somber and qualified, is for the most
part extremely sanguine about both the success of the "civil rights
revolution" and its prospects for continued social, political, and
legal progress toward a nonracist, egalitarian society. Using the
civil rights revolution forged by LDF's "dedicated band of lawyers"
as a prototype, Greenberg hopefully exhorts a new generation of
public interest lawyers and activists to take up the banner of law
reform-through-litigation and to continue the noble crusade. He invests considerable faith in the tenet that redemption lies with the
right kind of leaders:
Now is the time for a new movement, as tenacious, relentless, and
idealistic as that of the 1960s, a new Margold plan, or plans, as prescient as the original, and new leaders - a Charles Hamilton Houston, a Thurgood Marshall, a Martin Luther King, Jr. - who will hold
high ideals and at the same time keep clearly in mind what is possible
and how practically to achieve it. These new leaders will be large
people, large in character, large in vision, who will be prepared to
plunge into the struggle personally, wrestling with concrete issues as
Thurgood and Charlie Houston did in the early Restrictive Covenant,
White Primary, and school desegregation cases, and as Martin did in
the Montgomery bus strike and in the strategy and tactics of the
Selma to Montgomery march. [p. 516]
Failed Revolutions, conversely, is a bracing theoretical critique
of American law reform movements as distressingly and repetitively similar exemplars of the deficiencies of traditional legal
thought and practice. Wide-ranging and eclectic in their choice of
jurisprudential targets, Delgado and Stefancic identify the structure
of mainstream civil rights litigation as but one example of the stagnation of prevalent law reform efforts (p. xv). The authors speak
not from career-long experiences as civil rights litigators but as, "respectively, a law professor and a legal writer-information specialist
. . [who] have immersed ourselves in reform movements whose
*

4. Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, 1967-1991.
5. Senior District Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
6. Senior District Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) (holding public school segregation violative of the Equal
Protection Clause); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11) (declaring that racial discrimination in
public schools is unconstitutional and requiring schools to remedy discrimination "with all
deliberate speed").

8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding the death penalty in certain circumstances to be cruel and
unusual punishment).
9. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (prohibiting racially discriminatory barriers to employment).
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unfinished states we find deplorable and puzzling" (p. xv). According to Delgado and Stefancic, the conventional "hero" model of the
public interest lawyer cannot ameliorate the abysmally regressive
state of the current legal system; in fact, the authors argue, such a
model can be outright deleterious to social change movements by
fostering delusions of incremental progress that mask the desperate
need for fundamental change. Although they express considerable
admiration for the commitment of such "crusaders" as those
Greenberg lauds - and exemplifies o - the authors posit that
movement "saviors" are both "transformative and conservative at
the same time" (p. xvii), and they caution against the precipitous
embrace of reformers who may derail incipient revolutions by proposing or legitimating moderate rather than truly revolutionary
ideas. Rather, Delgado and Stefancic claim, the answer lies not in
heroism but in counterhegemony - in challenging the insidious influence of legal ideologies and institutions that limit our capacity to
imagine and implement radical solutions to society's ills (p. 143).
Thus, Failed Revolutions's interpretive stance toward the crusader
model of the public interest lawyer is staunchly counterheroic, if
not antiheroic, in nature. Even its title's shared use - with Crusaders in the Courts - of the term revolution reflects a gap of chasmic
proportions between the authors' perspective and Greenberg's; one
can infer, without too much of a stretch, that Delgado and Stefancic
adjudge the very same civil rights revolution heralded so proudly in
the title of Greenberg's memoirs to have been a well-intended but
ultimately disappointing failure.
Despite their markedly different goals and premises, however,
both books engage the question of how to use law, legal institutions, and lawyers as agents of social change in the United States.
Although Greenberg cautions that Crusadersin the Courts is "a history and not a blueprint" (p. 516) for a new civil rights movement,
the overall tenor of his reminiscences reveals a passionate commitment to such an endeavor. Clearly, he hopes that LDF's life story
as well as his own - will inspire and provide solace to post-civil
rights era reformers. Similarly, Delgado and Stefancic stress that
though their critique of the traditional law reform mindset is deeply
structural and at times caustically pessimistic, they intend it as a
counsel of encouragement rather than despair. They hope to help
reformers "persevere even when things look bleakest and victories
are longest in coming," and they suggest that through teaching
others to "understand the many ways in which we inscribe and rein10. P. xvii. Despite a soberingly critical premise, Failed Revolutions begins on a rather
splendidly dissonant and quixotic note, with both a dedication to "the many gallant activists,
lawyers and nonlawyers alike, who have struggled over the years against great odds to bring
about a more just society," and a frontispiece quotation from Robert F. Kennedy, "Some
men see things as they are and say, why; I dream things that never were and say, why not."
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scribe power and hierarchy, we may perhaps avoid ensnarement by
them in the future" (p. xviii). In this respect, therefore, both Crusaders in the Courts and FailedRevolutions seem bound by at least
one overarching set of commitments: the advancement of a progressive social reform agenda through creative use of the law 1 and
the inculcation of a new generation of lawyers, legal scholars, and
judges toward this end.
Within these broad parameters of similarity, however, the authors' divergent paths loom with stark and intriguing significance.
Greenberg stakes a more moderate and optimistic claim for gradual, piecemeal transformation through a combination of targeted
impact litigation, moral suasion, and public education. Delgado
and Stefancic advance the more radical assertion that such strategies are tepid, limited, delusionary, and ultimately ineffectual in the
face of internal psychological and external societal mechanisms that
subtly but inexorably stifle truly meaningful change.
Striking in their differences as well as in their overlapping interests in developing workable law reform strategies for the post-civil
rights era, Crusaders in the Courts and Failed Revolutions provide
provocative axes of comparison in yet another, although less obvious, respect - as contrasting opportunities to explore the potential
for a nexus between critical legal theory and lawyering practice in
both facilitating social change and understanding the hidden deterrents to such change. Although neither book explicitly articulates
this interrelationship as a central theme - and, in fact, Greenberg
largely eschews discussion of theory altogether, as opposed to legal
doctrine, in his descriptions of LDF's most momentous courtroom
challenges - the potential for a rich connection between critical
theory and practice is nevertheless a consideration that infuses both
Crusadersin the Courts and FailedRevolutions.
Crusadersin the Courts, published on the fortieth anniversary of
the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, takes its place in the burgeoning and fascinating genre
of historical chronicles and personal reminiscences of the modern
civil rights movement. 12 These works, far from being mere "war
stories" or "period pieces," offer much to the reader interested in
11. Greenberg, and Delgado and Stefancic, of course, may not necessarily agree on a
unified progressive social reform agenda, but their overall goals appear to contain enough
similarities to warrant a comparison of their disparate methodologies for achieving such an
agenda.
12. See, eg., HARRY S. AsHMoRE, CIWL RiGrrs AND WRONGS: A MEMOIR OF RACE
AND PoLIcs, 1944-1994 (1994); TAYLOR BRANCH,PARTING THE WATERs: AMERICA IN
Tm KING YEARs,1954-63 (1988); J.L. CHEsTNuT, JR. & JULIA CASS, BLACK IN SELMA: THE
UNCOMMON LIFE OF J.L. CHnsESTT, JR. (1990); SErIsMA CLARK, READY FROM VrITHIN:
SEPTIMA CLARK AND THE CIvu. RIom-Ts MovmENT (Cynthia Stokes Brown ed., 1986);
DAVID J. GARRow,BEARING Tm CRoss: MARTIN LUTHER KiNo, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986).
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law reform in this reactionary, post-civil rights era of opposition to

antidiscrimination laws and race-conscious remedies13 because they
serve as compelling reminders both of just how recently de jure discrimination reigned in this country and of the role of lawyer and
nonlawyer "everyday heroes" in resisting and dismantling it. What
these chronicles tend to lack, however - even those by movement
lawyers such as Greenberg and others 14 - is a theoretical framework within which the authors concretely assess their short-term
failures and successes in terms of a long-range vision of social reform. Admittedly, many memoirs in this genre do not aspire to
such a goal; as Greenberg observes, "I have written, inevitably,
from my own perspective, that of a lawyer who is not as detached as
a historian nor as engaged as the plaintiffs themselves" (p. xix).
Rather, many civil rights retrospectives aim primarily to educate
and inspire through the able telling of fascinating stories - and this
itself is no small contribution. Still, after reading an account as voluminous, detailed, and important as Crusadersin the Courts, one
yearns for a theoretical context within which to reflect upon Greenberg's description of LDF as "the organization that played a major
role - often the leading role and, at some times, the only role - in
the legal struggle to obtain for black Americans their full civil rights
as citizens" (p. xix). If it is the case that LDF, the nation's most
famous and historically most powerful civil rights law reform organization, has had only limited success in achieving its goals, what can
present and future progressive lawyers learn from its experiences?
Interestingly, FailedRevolutions - without focusing directly on
the subject matter of Crusaders in the Courts or other civil rights
movement histories - provides exactly such a theoretical context.
It posits that most so-called reformist revolutions fail, despite reformers' best intentions, not because of individually blameworthy
culprits or obsfructionists, but because of reformers' own inability
to identify and move past "the array of preconceptions, meanings,
and habits of mind that limit and frame the horizon of our possibilities" (p. xvi). Regardless of the short-term, stopgap successes, Delgado and Stefancic assert, reformist activists and lawyers are
doomed to repeat past mistakes so long as they systematically fail
to address the conscious and especially the unconscious mechanisms with which they themselves stymie truly meaningful progress.
13. See DINESH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EnucAIoN: Tim PoLmcs OF RACE AND SEX ON
CAMUS (1991); iCiHARD EPSEIN, FORBIDDEN GROuNDs: TmE CASE Aoi sr EMPLOY-

MENT DIsCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). For a more recent critical treatment of affirmative action, see Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. Rrv.
893 (1994).
14. See, eg., MoRRIs DES & STmvE FwF.R,A SEASON FOR Jusn=cE Tim LIFE AND
TMims OF CImL RIGHTS LAwYER MoRRs DEES (1991).
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The authors identify, and seek to resolve, the following prerequisite
questions in this regard:
Why does the marketplace of ideas fail to remedy deeply inscribed
social ills like racism and sexism? How do judges, including our
greatest jurists, continue to hand down decisions that a later time
finds shocking and regressive? How do lawyers and legal scholars
replicate and rehearse old arguments, seldom breaking free to new
planes of legal thought and innovation? Why do maverick thinkers
find themselves without a community, and how are outsiders
marginalized, their voices tamed and silenced?
Why do ostensibly fair-minded social scientists and observers have
difficulty seeing evidence for social reform? How do moderate saviors inhibit reform movements? How do objective rules and practices
favor the more powerful? How does the very language the Supreme
Court uses frustrate that institution's role as champion of the weak
and powerless? [p. xvi]
In raising and addressing these concerns, Delgado and Stefancic
draw heavily upon the emerging field of critical race jurisprudence
as well as upon nonlegal disciplines, such as history, literature, and
popular culture. Although their observations and tentative recommendations do not constitute, any more than does Greenberg's
book, an action plan for lawyering for social change, they nevertheless present an intriguing overlay of concerns germane to the unanswered questions of Crusaders in the Courts - namely, by what
standard should we measure the success or failure of the civil rights,
or any other law reform, revolution? What should be the role of
the progressive lawyer in such a revolution? Of what, if any, use is
critical theory in law reform practice?
This review examines the perspectives of Crusaders in the
Courts and FailedRevolutions in light of the above questions. Part
II focuses on Crusadersin the Courts, with particular emphasis on
Greenberg's assessment of LDF's influence in bringing about the
successes of the civil rights revolution through a crusader-oriented
model of lawyering. In Part III, I examine FailedRevolutions's implicit rejoinder to Greenberg's views and discuss Delgado and
Stefancic's theories of both why such revolutions fail and why such
well-intentioned reformers fail. I conclude by suggesting ways in
which the heavily practice-laden orientation of Greenberg's approach and the theoretical challenges posed by Delgado and
Stefancic's critique might find mutually beneficial convergence in a
theoretics of practice for progressive lawyers.
II.

CRUSADERS

iN THE COURTS

[P]ursuing Paul Freund's metaphor of the courts as "the substations
that transform the high-tension charge of the philosophers into the
reduced voltage of a serviceable current," LDF brought the decisions
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of these courts back to the people and plugged the current
of moral
5
and legal authority into the transactions of everyday life.'

A.

The Role of Law in the "Civil Rights Revolution"

As Greenberg's book amply details, the history of what is sometimes termed the civil rights revolution 16 overlaps to a great extent
with the history of LDF. Certainly, Crusadersin the Courts is not
the first book to point out this convergence, nor is it the only work
to accord deservedly central significance to LDF as a progenitor of
modem civil rights law.' 7 Formed in 1940 to advance the cause of
equal rights for African-Americans through the courts - and benefiting from the influence of such brilliant legal minds as Charles
Hamilton Houston, 18 Thurgood Marshall, and William Hastie 19 LDF won in its first decade of existence an impressive string of
pathbreaking courtroom victories, including the so-called white primary case of Smith v. Allwright20 and the restrictive covenant
cases.

21

These early years in the history of LDF, which Greenberg
chronicles in Parts I and II - entitled, respectively, "Preparing the
Ground" (pp. 3-81) and "Edging Toward a Showdown: Brown v.
15. P. 512 (quoting PAUL A. FREUND,THm SuPREmE COURT OF THE UNITED
ITS BUsINEss, PUmPosEs, AND PERFORMANCE 114 (1961)).

STATES:

16. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THm Hou.ow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT

SOCIAL CHANGE? 42-71 (1991).
17. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v.
BOARD OFEDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EUALIrrY (1977); MARK V.
TusHNET, THm NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINsT SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950
(1987).
18. Houston, eulogized by his colleague William H. Hastie (and remembered by Greenberg) as the "Moses" who "guided us through the legal wilderness of second-class citizenship" (p. 3), is one of the most influential figures in the history of civil rights law. A Phi Beta
Kappa graduate of Amherst College and the first Black elected to the HarvardLaw Review,
he went on to serve as dean of Howard University Law School and counsel for the NAACP.
He is widely acknowledged as the major architect of the step-by-step litigation strategy leading to Brown v. Board of Education. Pp. 4-5. See generally GENNA RAE McNEL, GROUNDwoK CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983).
19. Hastie, Houston's colleague in private practice as well as at LDF, was also a Phi Beta
Kappa graduate of Amherst College, editor of the Harvard Law Review, and dean of Howard University Law School. President Franklin Roosevelt appointed him federal district
judge in the Virgin Islands (a non-Article III position in 1937) making him the first black
federal judge in U.S. history. President Harry Truman appointed him governor of the Virgin
Islands in 1944. In 1949, Truman chose Hastie to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, making him the first black Article III judge in U.S. history. Pp. 36, 529 n.36;
see also GIBERT WARE, WILLIAM HASTIE: GRACE UNDER PREsstn

(1984).

20. 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down Texas's state convention-run, racially restrictive
primary because it violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
21. The most famous of these cases is Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (barring
judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in property deeds as violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment). For a history of the restrictive covenant litigation, see CrlmNTr E.
VosE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: Tim SuPREmE COURT, Tm NAACP, AND am RESTRIcrIvE
COVENANT CASES (1959).
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Board of Education" (pp. 85-194) - also encompassed Greenberg's appointment in 1949 as an LDF staff lawyer, fresh out of
Columbia Law School at the age of twenty-four. Greenberg's boss,
Thurgood Marshall, himself only forty-one, supervised a small legal
staff that also included such notable figures as Motley, Franklin H.
Williams,2 and Carter. Of those times, Greenberg recalls
sanguinely:
The mood always was exciting and upbeat, but we were plunging
ahead into the unknown. I have friends who were once South African
exiles, but who are now back in South Africa. Whenever I asked
them when they thought apartheid would come to an end, they'd say
they didn't know. One, Albie Sachs, responded, "Ten years ago I said
it would be in five years." I have visited them, after their return, in
Johannesburg and Cape Town - where I have stayed at Albie
Sachs's house - and the transition seems as though it was inevitable.
It was the same with us. Our generally upbeat attitudes told us that
legal apartheid in America would end. We knew we were helping to
end it. But for a long time we never knew how close we were to that
end or even if we were yet on the right road through the maze. [p. 25]
Yet, disappointingly, Greenberg's analogy between LDF's crusading revolutionaries and African National Congress freedom fighters
fails to follow through on-the possible significance of the most salient difference between the two groups: whereas LDF sought to end
American apartheid largely through a litigative strategy of fealty to
the norms and procedures of the existing legal system, the South
African anti-apartheid movement was of necessity predicated upon
a direct challenge to both the structural and substantive constraints
of that country's laws. Although Greenberg briefly touches on
LDF's perceptions of its own choices in this regard, further exploration of a comparative nature would have proven enormously helpful, particularly because it would have come from the perspective
of one who served "in the trenches" with such dedication and
distinction.
For the most part, the period of LDF's history generally referred to as the civil rights revolution begins with and is dominated
by LDF's litigation efforts in the school segregation cases - the era
of Brown v. Board of Education. The Brown chapters are absorbing and inspiring. In many ways these cases are the conceptual centerpiece of Crusadersin the Courts. Greenberg renders first-person
observations of the musings, deliberations, and courtroom strate-

22. Williams, praised by Greenberg as possibly "the most gifted speaker I ever heard" (p.
32), handled a number of key LDF cases, including Watts v. Indiana,338 U.S. 49 (1949), and
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (the "Groveland" case) (pp. 32-33, 537 n.99, 537
n.98).

May 1995]

De Jure Revolution

1181

gies of Marshall, Motley, Carter, Spottswood W. Robinson III,23
and Jim Nabrit, Jr.24 vividly, perceptively, and with clear affection
for the individuals involved. Given Greenberg's role in the entire
pre-Brown and Brown line of cases, it is perhaps understandable
that the number and enthusiasm of his anecdotes would outweigh
any attempt either to question the limitations of LDF's strategy in
the school segregation cases or to analyze dispassionately the longterm successes and failures of the Brown "revolution." Greenberg
perhaps most closely approaches such a critique in the book's last
substantive chapter, "A Summation: Victories and Defeats" (pp.
509-17), and in an arresting part of the Prologue in which he describes a "counterfactual novel" - once contemplated but never
written - about "an America in which the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund had never existed, in which Charles Houston
had never envisioned the concept of the legal campaign and
Thurgood Marshall had never directed the organization that carried
it out" (p. 12). In the Prologue, Greenberg speculates that without
LDF's courtroom victories such as Brown:
The civil rights movement of the 1960's, inspired by those victories,
might not have been born, at least not at that time and quite likely not
as a nonviolent movement. If by some chance it had been born, it
could not have long survived without effective legal defense. Without
a forceful movement, the Civil Rights Acts would not have been
adopted. If by happenstance some similar measures were adopted,
they might not have survived the baptism of fire that court challenges
exposed them to, and might never have developed into effective instruments for social justice. [p. 12]
In the closing pages of the book, Greenberg underscores this assessment of Brown and the civil rights revolution as undeniably transformative of "how blacks were seen and treated, by law and by
society in general, not only in schools but in many other areas of
life" (pp. 509-10). These optimistic assertions comport fully with
Greenberg's invocation of Paul Freund's vision of courts as the
"substations" of social changer - hopeful conclusions indeed
given the torpidity with which our society has realized the mandates
26
of the desegregation decisions and indeed of most civil rights laws.
23. Robinson, part of the Brown legal team, later became dean of Howard University
Law School and was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. Pp. 171-72, 519-20, 611 n.521.
24. Nabrit, also on the Brown team, later became dean of Howard University Law School
and then president of Howard University. Pp. 172-73, 293.
25. See supra text accompanying note 15.
26. More recently, Greenberg has noted the extent to which the promise of Brown remains unfulfilled because of societal crises such as drugs and poverty that remain "beyond
the power of the courts"; still, he defends Brown as instrumental in effecting long-term substantive reform in a range of contexts
There is now a large black middle class and substantial black political power (forty members of Congress, many mayors) as a result of the civil rights revolution, of which Brown
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In wishing for more critical introspection on Greenberg's part
on the long-term legacies of Brown and other aspects of the civil
rights revolution, I intend neither to underestimate the significance
of LDF's contributions to civil rights jurisprudence nor to devalue
the light shed upon those contributions by Greenberg's memoirs.
Rather, I am suggesting that a fuller assessment of LDF's strategies
as exemplars for future public interest litigation necessitates some
consideration of the most recent major critiques of the Brown litigation. 27 For example, in The Hollow Hope,28 political scientist
Gerald N. Rosenberg, after acknowledging the jurisprudential mythos of Brown as "[b]eing 'nothing short of a reconsecration of
American ideals,' "29 examines a range of data on public opinion,
rates of school desegregation, and other indicia of Southern noncompliance and concludes: "[W]hile there is little evidence that
Brown helped produce positive change, there is some evidence that
it hardened resistance to civil rights among both elites and the
white public."'30 Rosenberg buttresses this rather startling heterodoxy with findings suggesting that the positive extrajudicial effects
31
of Brown in its first two decades of existence were virtually nil,
and he refutes the assertions of those - including, presumably,
Greenberg - who would argue that the courts provided an impetus
for a civil rights revolution, if one indeed did occur. Rosenberg
characterizes interpretations like Greenberg's as the "Dynamic
Court" model32 and claims:
[T]he Dynamic Court view's claim that a major contribution of the
courts in civil rights was to give the issue salience, press political elites
to act, prick the consciences of whites, legitimate the grievances of
blacks, and fire blacks up to act is not substantiated.... While it must
be the case that Court action influenced some people, I have found no
evidence that this influence was widespread or of much importance to
was one of the main progenitors. This political and economic power is a direct consequence of Brown's perceptions and requirements.
Jack Greenberg, 258 THE NATION 722 (1994); see also Symposium, Does Brown Still Matter?,
258 TiE NATION 718 (1994).
27. Earlier influential critiques include Derrick Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, in SHADEs OF BROW,. NEw PERSPECrIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 90 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980) [hereinafter SHADEs OF BRowA,, and Derrick Bell, A Model Alternative
DesegregationPlan, in SHADEs OF BROWN, supra, at 124.
28. See ROSENBERG, supra note 16.
29. Id. at 39 (citing KLUGER, supra note 17, at 710).
30. Id. at 155.
31. Id. at 107-55.

32. Rosenberg describes this model as premised on the assumptions that:
[C]ourts have powerful indirect effects. Their politically neutral position allows them to
teach Americans about the meaning of their constitutional obligations. Court decisions
can change opinions, generate media coverage, and inspire action. They can provide the
necessary nudge to start the reform process. In other words, they have a unique and
important kind of potency.
Id. at 26.
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the battle for civil rights. The evidence suggests that Brown's major
positive impact was limited to reinforcing the belief
in a legal strategy
for change of those already committed to ita
Such a far-ranging thesis calls out strongly for rebuttal, not only
in its statistical particulars but in its general conclusion that public
interest lawyers perform the largely self-reinforcing function of legitimating through litigation their own progressive legal ideologies.
Greenberg's indirect response lies mainly in his general claim that
Brown's efficacy did not truly begin to manifest itself until the desegregation implementation decisions of the 1970s, 34 and that even
then, "the period of equality of educational opportunity... moved
forward fitfully" and spottily (p. 516).
In Race Against the Court,35 legal scholar Girardeau Spann advances a critique of both Brown and the notion of court-inspired
reform in many ways even more troubling than Rosenberg's.
Spann claims that the law reformer's reliance upon the courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, to hand down pronouncements of
legal equality is not only misguided but ultimately destructive of the
minority empowerment it aims to engender. He explains:
The inevitability of Supreme Court review is likely to have an adverse effect on minority interests because the Supreme Court has
been structured to operate in a manner that is inherently conservative. Life tenure and judicial independence cause the Court to function as a political force for preservation of the status quo. However,
because racial minorities in the United States are disadvantaged by
the socioeconomic status quo, the Court's inherent conservatism impairs minority efforts to achieve racial equality. The Court has manifested its inherent conservatism in subtle, yet effective, ways. Brown
v. Board of Education, the case most often lauded as the icon of judicial sensitivity to minority interests, has had the ironic effect of luring
racial minorities into a dependency relationship with the
3 6 Court that
has impeded minority efforts to acquire political power.
By this account, therefore, the civil rights litigator - even with
the best of intentions - fosters the institutional tendency of courts
to perpetuate the "continued subordination of racial minority interests."37T Greenberg's chronicle of LDF's civil rights successes and
failures proceeds on a radically different premise: that court-driven
reform, though not a panacea, was certainly the linchpin of the civil
rights revolution. As such, LDF's revolution occurred primarily in
33. Id. at 156.
34. Greenberg cites Alexander v. Holmes County Bd.of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218 (1969), and
Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBidof Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), as the truly effective turning
points in desegregation law. Pp. 384-89.
35. G
nARDEAu
A. SpAwN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT (1993).
36. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 5; see also id. at 165-69.
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the courts, 38 with litigators as the most visible crusaders for justice.

Although Crusaders in the Courts movingly and spiritedly propounds this vision, it does not take into account the disheartening
possibility that this strategy was not, in the end, "the right road

through the maze" (p. 25).
B.

The Public Interest Lawyer as Crusader

Closely related to Greenberg's concept of the civil rights era as
a court-inspired revolution is a model of progressive lawyering
honed by LDF as one of the earliest and most influential public
interest law firms in the nation. As the Afterword of Crusadersin
the Courts impressively attests, the roster of past and present LDFaffiliated lawyers is a veritable "Who's Who" of some of the nation's most prestigious judges, practitioners, and legal scholars;
Greenberg generously and meticulously lists the names and present
affiliations of scores of them, lauding them as "Charlie Houston's
band of freedom fighters [who] fought and won the last civil rights
revolution" (p. 522).
Greenberg spends less time, unfortunately, exploring what must
have been -

and must continue to be -

the fascinating profes-

sional and interpersonal dynamics of such a diverse group regarding
the role of the progressive lawyer in facilitating social change.
Surely, LDF, even given the vital importance of, and, one might
argue, the historical necessity of, the "small band of crusading lawyers" approach of its early years,3 9 must have had numerous critical
junctures of self-reflection regarding the efficacy of its approach to
civil rights work - not just in terms of case docket selection and
project development, two areas that Greenberg documents well
(pp. 366-67, 371-72), but also with regard to the wisdom of various
lawyering strategies, or what today might be called lawyering the38. Although Greenberg does acknowledge that "Brown marked the end of that phase of
the civil rights struggle where all our important victories were won in court," and that "the
spirit of revolt," led to massive resistance in the streets, it is clear that his, and LDF's, chosen
path lay in courtroom challenges. P. 267; see also CsmsrErur & CAss, supra note 12, at 192:
As a lawyer representing the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in the midst of a street
protest movement, I was stretched between competing philosophies and egos, and my
own beliefs were challenged. [Martin Luther] King's philosophy that we had a moral
right to disobey unjust laws ran counter to my legal training. Though I understood the
limitations of the judicial system - white men in black robes had upheld Jim Crow for
almost a century - I was trained to believe that you changed the system through the
system. You didn't go out and break the law. You went to court.
Id.
39. At the time of LDF's founding, Greenberg helpfully reminds us, discrimination
against African-Americans and Jews in the legal profession was blatant and rampant. The
American Bar Association did not admit African-Americans, and most major law firms
would not hire African-Americans or Jews. P. 24. Women of color suffered similar slights;
Greenberg recounts an incident in 1946 in which a doorman nearly prevented Constance
Baker Motley from entering the headquarters of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York because he would not take her word that she was a member. P. 36.

May 1995]

De Jure Revolution

1185

ory.40 Greenberg occasionally hints at such differences - for example, in fleeting references to former LDF staff attorney Derrick
Bell's disapproval of LDF's direction in its school desegregation
cases (pp. 292, 502) - but for the most part such recollections
center on what appear to be the personal rather than the philosophical aspects of those disagreements. 41 Given Greenberg's exposure
to and leadership of such a distinguished, provocative, and eclectic
group of legal minds over a span of thirty-five years, it would have
benefited the reader immensely to have more than a glimpse of
LDF's deliberations on these concerns.
In the absence of evidence of such dialogue, the primary model
of LDF lawyering that emerges in Greenberg's work is that of the
lawyer-as-crusader - a prototype of lone heroism and lawyer-centered decisionmaking sometimes criticized today as overly preoccupied with lawyer, rather than client, prerogatives. 42 Particularly in
his engaging accounts of LDF strategy sessions during the critical
pre-Brown and Brown years, Greenberg strongly conveys the impetus in favor of such a "top-down" approach. He quotes spirited exchanges from a "black summit," including LDF lawyers Marshall
and Robinson, sponsored by the Journalof Negro Education to assess the viability of various legal challenges to the "separate but
equal" doctrine, and he effectively expresses both the urgency and
the vitality of the event (pp. 112-15). Ultimately, however, as
40. The past two decades have witnessed the development of a significant body of scholarship regarding the various theoretical frameworks within which progressive lawyers operate. See eg., GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, Tim LAwYE iNG PRocEss: MATERIALS
FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCrION IN ADVOCACY (1978); GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELUOUS LAWYERING: ONE CMCANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSrVE LAW PRACtiCE (1992); Anthony V. Al-

fieri,
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE
L.J. 2107 (1991); Conference, Theoretics of Practice: The Integrationof Progressive Thought
and Action, 43 HAsrmos L.J. 717 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination,RhetoricalSurvival
Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990).
41. For example, Greenberg provocatively notes but does not elaborate upon possible
substantive reasons for Bell's differences with the LDF:
Bell disapproved of the Fund's school desegregation and other programs as well as of
me personally, referring to LDF during the time I was its director-counsel as a "penthouse plantation," and writing that I "evidenced... intolerance based on a sense of
hereditary superiority." He encouraged and counseled a black'student boycott of me
and Julius Chambers when we jointly taught a civil rights course at Harvard in January
1984.
P. 292. Moreover, rather than examining the possible philosophical unddrpinnings of Bell's
and others' objections to both Greenberg's LDF leadership and his Harvard appointment,
Greenberg unfortunately chooses to interpret such opposition as "racist" or "crazy." Pp.
502-04. Notwithstanding the pain Greenberg obviously and understandably suffered over
both disputes, his recounting of these events - especially in the context of an organizational
history and not just a personal memoir - would have benefited considerably from a more
measured and complex analysis.
42. See, eg., L6PEZ, supra note 40, at 24 (decrying what he calls the regnant ideal of
progressive lawyers as political heroes and preeminent problem solvers because they "try
little to learn whether and how formal changes in law penetrate the lives of subordinated
people").
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Greenberg stresses, LDF lawyers remained the primary architects
of their litigation strategy:
Out of all this deeply held, but often confficting, advice came the
style of attack as the school cases moved from trial courts to the
Supreme Court: a clear eye on the goal, cautious probing, with a si-

multaneous willingness to retreat a bit or accept only modest gains
rather than risk a total setback. The legal leadership
of the LDF,
43
while always idealists, were never ideologues.

One of the liveliest and most revealing passages in the book
concerns the resolution of such lawyering theory questions in
LDF's early years. In a chapter describing LDF's nascent litigation
style in the 1940s and 1950s, Greenberg conceptually distinguishes
impact-oriented public interest law from what he terms the more
traditional form of client-centered lawyering, implicitly defending
the former:
The traditional legal model is that of lawyer representing a client,
doing the client's bidding and representing only the client's interests,
irrespective of the needs of society or groups within it. LDF, however, practiced an early version of what has come to be known as
public interest law ....Generations later, some critics attacked our
kind of legal practice as not responsive to the needs of constituencies
who might be affected by the cases we brought and the precedents we
helped make, and not fully focused on the special needs of individual
clients. LDF rejects those charges now and would have rejected them
then, but that debate had not developed at a time when going to court
offered the only avenue of reform with any real prospect for
success.44

Arguably, Greenberg's generalizations about the "traditional
legal model" as "representing only the client's interests," particularly in the context of the progressive lawyer's role, are as sweeping
and implicitly condemnatory as he believes those of LDF's critics to
be. In addition, Greenberg's seeming dichotomization of the existing array of lawyering approaches as either client-driven or
43. P. 115. Although Greenberg does embrace the hero model and moniker to describe
LDF attorneys' work, he emphasizes the LDF's cautious and pragmatic manner as well:
"One romantic notion has the heroic leader charging into battle, sword held high, ready to
smite the enemy, whomever it turns out to be, entertaining no possibility of adjusting the
pace or temporarily moderating the goal. But these were of a different breed of heroes." P.
115.
44. P. 107. Ironically, although Greenberg describes the individual client-centered approach, as opposed to impact litigation, as having been the traditional method of public interest representation at the time of the LDF's founding, many lawyering-theory scholars today
emphasize the former approach as less traditional, more empowering, and more effective in
encouraging social change. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling
Lawyers, 43 HAsTnNrs L.J. 769 (1992); Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rv. 1
(1984); Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice; Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration,77 GEo. L. 1603 (1989); Lucie E. White, Seeking "...
the Faces of
Otherness. . .: A Response to Professors Sara4 Felstiner,and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1499 (1992); White, supra note 40.
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cause-driven imposes a bipolar model on what is today - and may
always have been - a much more complex continuum of human
relationships between the progressive lawyer and her clients. 45 As
recent works in critical lawyering theory suggest, a collaborative relationship among progressive lawyers, clients, and lay advocates
may be more effective, more realistic, and more humane than either
a solely top-down model or a solely client-centered relationship. 46
Indeed, Greenberg's own richly descriptive anecdotes, particularly
about Marshall's idiosyncratic and allusive lawyering style, suggest
that there was in reality more of a theoretical bent to LDF's internal lawyering decisions than meets the eye. It is unfortunate that
Crusadersin the Courts, in its emphasis on the crusader paradigm,
does not more fully address the complexities of LDF's choices
about its aporoach to lawyering.
III. FAILED REVOLUTIONS
We write for the reader who is troubled by our time's being one of
particular stagnation, when most of the serious business of past reform movements seems to be at a standstill. We write for the reader
who struggles to understand why momentum appears to be as often
backward as forward - why most revolutions, in the words of our
title, fail. [p. xv]
A.

Why Revolutions Fail
In distinct divergence from Greenberg's optimistic appraisal of
the civil rights revolution as a flawed but ultimately noteworthy
harbinger of progress, Delgado and Stefancic offer a considerably
more solemn estimation of our current social and legal predicament
in Failed Revolutions. After reading their grim assessment, one
might conclude cynically that modem American social reform
efforts characterized as revolutions47 are, at best, in perhaps only one
sense revolutionary: they usually travel circular paths back to their
points of origin. Even worse, Delgado and Stefancic contend, the
delusions of grandeur that even well-meaning reformers bring to
45. For an exploration of this point in a sociolegal context, see William L.F. Felstiner &
Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client
Interactions,77 CoimLL L. REv. 1447 (1992).
46. See, eg., L6pEz, supranote 40, at 55 (arguing for lawyer-client collaborative interaction as part of a nonhierarchical, "larger network of cooperating problem-solvers"); Anthony
V. Alfieri, PracticingCommunity, 107 HARv. L. REv.1747, 1763-64 (1994) (reviewing L6PEz, supra note 40) (urging lawyers to work collaboratively with clients and communities
based on the realization that "our professional autonomy is linked to the autonomy of others
and that our claims of neutrality are false").
47. Although Delgado and Stefancic suggest that failed revolutions exist outside as well
as within legal contexts, they focus at greatest length on three such law reform revolutions:
race relations and civil rights (pp. 3-22); the antipomography movement and women's rights
(pp. 81-92); and the environmental movement (pp. 95-104).
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their work have the regressive effect of pushing society even farther
backward on the road to social change; this phenomenon occurs
precisely because reformers fail to comprehend and deconstruct the
larger structural, institutional, and attitudinal barriers that insidiously frustrate truly radical reform. As a result, the authors conclude, "earnest and well-meaning efforts to change things have a
way of going for naught" (p. xv).
Interestingly, the authors' principal diagnosis of the problem begins with the self - that is, with the two basic human failings identified as the "fear of extinction, of change that is too far-reaching"
and "the 'once done' fallacy - the belief that a problem once addressed is solved, and that once solved is solved forever" (pp. xvixvii). Rather than pointing a finger at a particular legal institution
or malefactor, Delgado and Stefancic suggest that the vexing dilemma of stymied social reform is far more complex and intractable. Revolutions fail because we deceive ourselves into thinking
that revolutions can actually succeed, when in fact our only prospects for long-lasting change lie in an ongoing cycle of interrogation, critique, resistance, and struggle. In other words, the authors
argue, reformers should never assume that victory is around the
corner. Even optimism can be a trap for the unwary: "Hope, unaccompanied by a comprehensive critique of social institutions, can be
a formula for premature capitulation and defeat; paradoxically, the
person who counsels simplistic, hopeful philosophies can end up being the real nihilist." 48
In support of this hypothesis, Delgado and Stefancic draw upon
an impressively broad, creative, and eclectic range of examples
from both legal and nonlegal contexts. The structure of FailedRevolutions is unconventional for a legal text in that it neither lists nor
describes the reasons why revolutions fail in the linear, case-by-case
manner of the advocate; rather, the authors proceed thematically
toward their conclusion by discussing overarching and overlapping
problems of "imagination, then perception, then reception" (p.
xviii). Although the authors' backgrounds and expertise are rooted
primarily in the study of law reform, they posit that their conclusions are generalizable to many other contexts. In fact, an implicit
assumption underlying Failed Revolutions seems to be that a primary reason so-called legal revolutions are doomed to fail is that
lawyers wrongly assume that law can play a catalytic role in correcting injustices. In contrast to Greenberg's embrace of law as a
48. P. 146. In this respect, the authors' conclusions evoke the perspective of another
leading critical race scholar, Derrick Bell, regarding the eluctable nature of social reform.
Asserting that "[b]lack people will never gain full equality in this country," Bell nevertheless
exhorts activists to adopt a "racial realist" perspective and to combat racism regardless of the
outcome of such battles. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT TmE BoTtoM OF THE WELu TAE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 12 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
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dynamic solution and courts as substations of social change, Delgado and Stefancic conceive of both as mostly backward-looking
and obstructionist.
The authors' thesis proceeds in four major parts.49 Part One,
"On the Difficulty of Imagining a Better Society" (pp. 1-50), addresses internal human barriers of limited imagination, which stifle
revolutionary thought before it has a chance to occur by suppressing "the transformative impulse in ourselves and each other"
(p. xvii). The authors offer three primary examples of this phenomenon: In "Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture:
Can Free Expression Remedy Deeply Inscribed Social Ills?" (pp. 322), the authors provocatively argue that the dominant model of
First Amendment jurisprudence actually subverts rather than encourages democratic ideals by tolerating - and perhaps valorizing
the virtually untrammeled expression of racist stereotypes. In
"Judges' Misjudgments" (pp. 23-40), Delgado and Stefancic target
the limited imaginative and empathic horizons of judges, particularly those at the appellate level, by considering whether the judges
in a sampling of notorious cases 50 might have decided those cases
differently if they had had the benefit of access to "saving counternarratives" - that is, narratives that emphasized the humanity
of the groups whote rights the judges ultimately denied. The authors conclude that such access either did not or would not have
made a difference, primarily because of the structural impediments
and personal prejudices that systemically prevent judges from contemporaneously discerning the "serious moral error" of their interpretations (p. 37). In "Why Do We Tell the Same Stories? Law
Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma" (pp.
49. Much of FailedRevolutions is adapted from law review articles published by Delgado
and Stefancic between 1989 and 1995.
50. The authors define these notorious cases as riddled with "serious moral error":
A decision embraces serious moral error if (1) it proceeds blithely ignorant of moral
complexity; (2) it is broadly or universally condemned by subsequent generations, somewhat akin to being overruled; and (3) its assumptions, for example, about women, are
roundly refuted by later experiences. Judges will always hand down decisions that will
seem offensive to some. We reserve the term "serious moral error" for those shocking
cases that virtually everyone later condemns.
P. 23. The cases chosen, given in the order in which they appear in the book, are: Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (refusing to recognize the personhood of blacks);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (declaring separate-but-equal accommodations for
blacks and whites constitutional); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (denying Indian tribes the ability to sell land); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)
(prohibiting the return of a Chinese laborer to the United States under legislation passed
since his departure); Hirabayashiv. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (allowing the government to impose a curfew on individuals of Japanese ancestry); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of Japanese internment during World
War H); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding a state's authority to.
bar women from practicing law); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state law mandating sterilization of the mentally disabled); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (allowing states to criminalize consensual sodomy). Pp. 25-36.
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41-50), the authors provide a partial explanation for the paucity of
saving counternarratives, asserting that traditional library classification systems in legal scholarship operate both to exclude unconventional sources and to discourage innovative thought. The authors
conclude that as a result of all of these barriers, reformers fail to
grasp not only what truly revolutionary thought is all about but also
the limits of their own imaginings in this regard (p. 48).
In Part TWo, "On the Difficulty of Hearing What Our Prophets
Are Saying" (pp. 51-91), Delgado and Stefancic identify what they
call problems of perception, attributable in part to the "variety of
marginalizing devices that ensure that reformers are seen as partisan and extreme" (p. xvii). This section focuses primarily on exclusionary practices in the legal academy that attempt to defuse the
power of radical ideas and scholarship by characterizing them as
unscholarly, intellectually unsound, overly subjective, and political.
In "The Imperial Scholar: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing"
(pp. 53-66) and "Gathering with the Like-Minded: Symposium
Battles" (pp. 67-80), for example, the authors acerbically dissect
what they view as the tendency of prestigious mainstream legal
scholars - aided by "clubby" law review symposia (p. 78) - to
trivialize "outsider" scholarship 51 through ignoring, distorting, or
condescendingly addressing its major premises. Delgado and
Stefancic proffer this phenomenon as another concrete illustration
of why revolutions fail - namely, because radical thought is accepted only after it has been so thoroughly assimilated and tempered that it has lost its original corrosive edge of efficacy:
We take seriously new social thought only after hearing it so often
that its tenets and themes begin to seem familiar, inevitable, and true.
We then adopt the new paradigm, and the process repeats itself. We
reject new thought until, eventually, its hard edges soften, its suggestions seem tame and manageable, its proponents elder statespersons
to be feared no longer. By then, of course, the new thought has lost
its radically transformative character. We reject the medicine that
could save us until, essentially, it is too late. [p. 64]
In the final chapter of Part TWo, "Pornography and Harm to
Women: 'No Empirical Evidence'?" (pp. 81-91), Delgado and
Stefancic examine the perception problem in the context of societal
resistance to feminist reformers who advocate the regulation of
pornography. 52 Analogizing degrading pornographic images to the
51. Delgado and Stefancic define outsider jurisprudence as consisting of three main
strands of legal theory: critical legal studies, feminism, and critical race theory. Many mainstream scholars, the authors contend, try to "muffle and tame" these "insurgent scholars"
through a variety of marginalizing mechanisms designed to devalue the originality of outsider
contributions. P. 57.
52. For influential feminist viewpoints on pornography regulation, compare CATHARINE
MAcKmNNON, ONLY WoRDs (1993) with NADiNE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PoRNoGRAPHY:
FREE SPECaH, SEx, AND a FIGH FOR WoMEN's RIGHTS (1995).
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racist stereotypes discussed in the book's first chapter, the authors
argue similarly that the very ubiquity of the harms inflicted by such
images tend to render the harms invisible. Because, the authors
continue, "pornography is a tacitly recognized good that the dominant group depends on to achieve certain ends and is naturally reluctant to relinquish" (p. 81), opponents of pornography regulation
deploy a range of mechanisms designed to downplay pornography's
injurious effects and to ostracize antipornography feminists as "antimale, antisex, and puritanical" (p. 89).
In Parts Three and Four - "Why We Always Embrace Moderate Solutions (or Saviors)" (pp. 93-111) and "Supreme Court (and
Other) Rhetoric: How the Way Powerful Institutions Talk Can Devalue and Marginalize Outsider Groups" (pp. 113-41), respectively
the authors address problems of reception encountered by radical thinkers who try to advance far-reaching and novel theories
through litigation and other law reform efforts. Closely linked conceptually to the previous chapters, these concluding sections assert
that revolutions fail in part because reformers fail and that reformers fail because our legal system, as well as society more generally,
is structurally incapable of accommodating truly daring and original
leaders (pp. 101-03, 138-41). Instead, society tends to embrace only
the "moderate" savior, the assimilationist who prudently and conservatively bridges the gap between stagnation and radical solutions: "Most serious movements fail because society prefers
incremental rather than wide-ranging change. In a version of the
maxim that 'bad money drives out good,' we are almost invariably
drawn to doomed, moderate approaches ... when society needs
more sweeping, ambitious ones" (p. 96). Thus, in " 'Our Better Natures': A Revisionist View of the Public Trust Doctrine in Environmental Theory" (pp. 95-103), the authors offer environmental law
scholar Joseph Sax's public trust doctrine as an example of a reformist solution ultimately flawed by its moderation. In "Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power" (pp. 105-11), Delgado and Stefancic
critique legal doctrine's ostensibly neutral and reasonable emphasis
on objective versus subjective standards as a mask for cultural
power plays that routinely devalue or ignore the rights of
subordinated groups. Finally, in "Scorn and Imposition - How We
Use Language, Consciously or Unconsciously, to Derail Reform"
(pp. 115-41), the authors decry the manipulation of language itself,
particularly in U.S. Supreme Court discourse, to ridicule radical
ideas and reformers: "[The Court] is applying suspicion - cool,
sometimes disrespectful treatment - to blacks, welfare recipients,
prisoners, gays, and other disempowered litigants. And it is treating with exaggerated respect the military, large corporations, arms
of government, and other empowered actors" (p. 116).
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In their skeptical evaluation of the role of law in effecting social
change - an estimation considerably grimmer than Greenberg
evinces in Crusadersin the Courts - Delgado and Stefancic draw
upon various tenets of critical theory, particularly critical race theory. Prominent among these concerns is a deep-seated doubt about
law itself - not only as an instrumentally viable tool for the eradication of subordination but also as an ostensible locus of neutrality
53
through which concepts of justice and equality might be mediated.
Terming this skepticism postmodernist, Angela Harris describes the
manner in which proponents of critical race theory - or as she calls
them, race-crits - strive to question everything in their quest to
expand the boundaries of conventional legal categories:
The deeper that race-crits dig, the more embedded racism seems
to be; the deeper the race-crit critique of western culture goes, the
more useful postmodernist philosophy becomes in demonstrating that
nothing should be immune from criticism. By calling everything
taken for granted into question, postmodernist critique potentially
clears the way for alternative accounts of social reality, including
ac54
counts that place racism at the center of western culture.
In many ways a postmodernist critique of the type Harris describes, Failed Revolutions applies the above-described interrogative approach to clear the way for alternative accounts not only of
race and the civil rights revolution but of the notion of law reform
itself.55 In stark contrast with the vision of revolutionary legal
change propounded in Crusaders in the Courts, in which LDF by
turns battled, cajoled, confronted, maneuvered, shamed, and persuaded the courts to place racial equality at the center of our constitutional culture in decisions such as Brown and Griggs, Delgado
and Stefancic suggest that such litigative legerdemain was probably
just "shadowboxing." Whereas LDF's civil rights revolution, as described by Greenberg, proceeds in a "brick-by-brick" fashion
through decisions won and legislation passed, Delgado and
53. Failed Revolutions in many ways illustrates what Delgado himself described in an
earlier article as the fundamental characteristics of critical race scholarship:
(1) an insistence on "naming our own reality"; (2) the belief that knowledge and ideas
are powerful; (3) a readiness to question basic premises of moderate/incremental civil
rights law; (4) the borrowing of insights from social science on race and racism; (5) critical examination of the myths and stories powerful groups use to justify racial subordination; (6) a more contextualized treatment of doctrine; (7) criticism of liberal legalisms;
and (8) an interest in structural determinism - the ways in which legal tools and
thought-structures can impede law reform.
Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. Rv.
95, 95 n.1 (1990).
54. Angela P. Harris, Foreword. The Jurisprudenceof Reconstruction, 82 CAL L REV.
741, 749 (1994) (footnote omitted).
55. For an exploration of whether the implications of critical race theory differ significantly from those of.more traditional civil rights scholarship, see Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo
Newborn, CriticalRace Theory and Classical-LiberalCivil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction
Without a Difference?, 82 CAt. L. REv. 787 (1994).
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Stefancic claim that revolutions constructed on such a foundation
are mired in quicksand. Ultimately, the tantalizing question raised
by Failed Revolutions's withering critique of law reform is one the
authors address -

but do not wholly resolve -

in the volume's

conclusion (pp. 143-44): What vision of progressive lawyering can
combat, or at least diminish, the tendency of legal revolutions to
fail?
B.

The Public Interest Lawyer as Skeptic: Why Quit?

To the authors' credit, they do not set forth the grave observations of FailedRevolutions without addressing the concerns of progressive practitioners and practitioners-to-be. If they ignored these
concerns, one might answer the all-important normative question of
"What should be done?" with the world-weary response: "Nothing.
Give up. We are doomed to fail." Instead, consistent with the reconstructive bent of critical race theory,5 6 the authors attempt in
the book's Epilogue to inject some measure of cheer and encouragement for the aspiring public interest lawyer (pp. 145-46). Their
advice - indeed, their proffered model of progressive lawyering provides an intriguing contrast with the more upbeat, dynamic paradigm that Greenberg suggests in Crusadersin the Courts.
Delgado and Stefancic's counsel, in short, is for progressive lawyers to be critical, disbelieving skeptics: to realize that the ideal of
change through law is, if not panglossian, at least volatile and temporary in nature; and to relinquish the self-aggrandizing fantasy
that lawyers can accomplish anything more than incremental improvements (p. 146). Certain aspects of this advice at least superficially resemble Greenberg's model of the public interest lawyer as
crusader. For example, Greenberg would certainly agree that lawyers need to be skeptical and persevering, and Delgado and
Stefancic would likely aver that society needs lawyers who are visionary and heroic. Below the surface, however, Delgado and
Stefancic's qualified pessimisn]5 7 hints at a drastically different,
counterhegemonic role for the public interest lawyer. Such a role
would be rooted in hope, realism, and despair:
Hope is, of course, necessary for any long and difficult struggle. But
equally important is an understanding of how society works. An indi56. For an analysis of the reconstructive ideals of critical race theory, especially in comparison with the deconstructive predilections of critical legal studies, see Harris, supra note
54, at 750-54 (noting the commitment of critical race theorists to the "liberation of people of
color from racial subordination"). See also Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent,
AntidiscriminationLaw, and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE LJ. 1329
(1991).
57. The authors' dire observations are quite decidedly qualified: "It is important to us
that [law students] not see this book as a counsel of despair, for that is not how it is intended." P. 145.
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vidual who understands the ways near-universal forces resist change is
better armored against self-blame. He or she realizes that failure is
not always the result of lack of skill or nerve, that the real question is
often not, Why go on? but, Why quit? [pp. 145-46]
If, as FailedRevolutions suggests, the inevitability of law reformas-failure renders necessary the development of both more realistic
ways of defining success and more innovative strategies for avoiding the pitfalls of false consciousness, the implications for progressive practice are considerable. Notwithstanding the likelihood that
many progressive practitioners, in an era of increasingly conservative legislatures and courts, may already have to console themselves
with a "why quit?" attitude, it is worth exploring in detail just how
and why such an outlook would operate to the benefit of clients and
client communities as well as their attorneys. With respect to the
lawyering theory concerns raised earlier in this review regarding
LDF's representational strategies in Crusaders in the Courts,58 it
would be instructive to learn Delgado and Stefancic's perspective
on how their postmodernist critique of law reform could or should
affect, for example, the micro-level decisions of client representation, choice of impact strategies, lawyer-client interaction, and client autonomy. In other words, what does it mean - or could it
mean - to combine the theoretical insights of critical race jurisprudence with the conservatizing pressures and demands of everyday
public interest practice? 59
IV.

NExus BETWEEN CRITICAL THEORY
AND PROGRESSIVE PRACrICE

CONCLUSION:

THE

Given Greenberg's stated objectives for his book, as well as its
value as a personal memoir of the civil rights movement, Crusaders
in the Courts deserves both a wide audience and high regard. It
contains a wealth of historical materials and insights regarding one
of the most significant eras in American jurisprudence. Still,
Greenberg's retrospective - especially when considered against
the backdrop of the trenchant critique of social reform movements
offered by Delgado and Stefancic in Failed Revolutions - leaves
this reader wishing for a broader and more nuanced analysis of the
many unresolved dilemmas of the post-Brown, post-civil rights era.
Although Greenberg and LDF are surely not solely responsible for
the ultimate resolution of these quandaries - any more than they
were solely responsible for the revolution that preceded them - it
58. See supra notes 40, 42-46 and accompanying text.
59. For an argument that the insights of critical race theory and progressive lawyering can
be compatible and mutually reinforcing, see Margaret M. Russell, Entering GreatAmerica:
Reflections on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice,43 HAs.
TIos LJ. 749 (1992).
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seems both logical and fair to expect Crusadersin the Courts to reflect upon the significance of the present-day deterioration of its
past courtroom glories.
FailedRevolutions, in comparison, is firmly - and perceptively
anchored in a theoretical dissection of contemporary malaise.
Although the authors' concluding exhortations are cautiously optimistic and intended to be encouraging, it is nevertheless the case
that the budding lawyer may be at a loss over exactly how to proceed "when 'the path is long and the night dark" (p. 146). Delgado and Stefancic offer broad-based conceptual suggestions,
ranging from "distrust[ing] the ability of free-market solutions" to
"pay[ing] particular attention to what our mavericks and reformers
are saying" (p. 143), but the practitioner understandably may hunger for more.
Given the widely dissimilar approaches of these works, it may
be that one cannot locate them on common ground in any significant measure; however, their authors' overlapping concerns with
the use of law in the service of social change suggest that increased
attention to the nexus between critical theory and progressive practice is in order. Such a theoretics of practice 6° should draw upon
the richness of narrative histories of progressive lawyers' experiences in the trenches, as well as modern and postmodern critiques
of traditional lawyering strategies. Without attention to both, law
reform efforts will inevitably suffer losses of pragmatic and imaginative perspectives. Even with both, revolution by law may never
be realized - but at least we will begin to comprehend why such
revolutions fail.
60. See Conference, supra note 40.

